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Abstract: Israel M. Kirzner is the 2006 winner of The International Award for Entrepreneurship and Small 
Business Research. In this essay, we present and evaluate his main contributions to the economics of 
entrepreneurship. 
The focus is on how Kirzner defines the entrepreneurial function. In order to better understand his theory, 
we posit Kirzner’s notion of an entrepreneur in the Austrian tradition. In so doing we emphasize that this concept 
opens up different perspectives as compared to the neoclassical theoretical framework. The three areas of 
economic policy, justice and freedom and economic growth are discussed. We also show why the Kirznerian 
entrepreneur makes these issues relevant.  
Perhaps most importantly, Kirzner has made the Austrian School intelligible for non-Austrians. By 
bridging the chasm between Austrian and mainstream thinking, the crucial role of entrepreneurship and the 
individual entrepreneur has become visible to a much broader audience.  
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It is [the] entrepreneurial element that is responsible for our understanding of human 
action as active, creative and human rather than passive, automatic and mechanical. 
(Kirzner 1973, p. 35) 
 
A free society is fertile and creative in the sense that its freedom generates alertness to 
possibilities that may be of use to society; a restriction on the freedom of a society 
numbs such alertness and blinds society to possibilities of social improvement. By the 
very nature of the damage such restriction wreaks, its harmful effects on social welfare 
may not be able to be noticed, measured or specified (Kirzner, 1979, p. 239). 
 
 
The Swedish Foundation for Small Business Research (FSF) and the Swedish Board of 
Industrial and Technical Development (NUTEK) have given their 2006 International Award 
for Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research to Israel M. Kirzner. In this article, we 
present and evaluate the contributions of the Prize winner to the economics of 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Kirzner has become known as one of the most vocal and strongest critics of the neoclassical 
preoccupation with equilibrium outcomes (Kirzner, 1982). But Kirzner’s attitude has never 
been one of outright rejection. On the contrary, we will argue that one of his greatest 
contributions has been to bring the Austrian analysis more in line with mainstream 
economics. Today, such a prominent member of the so-called mainstream as Josh Lerner at 
Harvard Business School uses Kirzner’s writings in his teaching. 
 
But also mainstream economics has changed dramatically in recent decades, to the extent that 
some have proclaimed the death of neoclassicism (Colander, 2000). Others have proposed 
that recent developments in mainstream economics, notably a greater focus on bounded 
rationality, rule following, institutions, cognition and evolutionary aspects, have brought 
Austrian economics closer to the mainstream (Koppl, 2006). Although Kirzner’s work starts 
out from the other side of the neoclassical-Austrian divide, we will argue that his work has 
also indirectly contributed to the development within mainstream economics. 
 
Despite these recent developments, our discussion will to a large extent revolve around 
neoclassicism and Kirzner’s seemingly ambivalent relation to that theory. Here, the 




tradition also provided a natural theoretical habitat for the entrepreneur. The most important 
of these concepts are subjectivity, ignorance and economic mistakes; all of which can be 
traced back to Carl Menger, the father of the Austrian school (Kirzner, 1978). Therefore, it 
will be important to outline the historical context from which Kirzner has developed his 
thinking. 
 
Kirzner’s theory can be related to neoclassicism by saying that the entrepreneur is someone 
who is alert to out-of-equilibrium profit opportunities. As such, the Kirznerian entrepreneurs 
can be seen as substitutes for the Walrasian auctioneer. But this change in the nature of the 
auctioneer has far-reaching consequences. Thus, even though the main body of Kirzner’s 
academic work has been revolving around the entrepreneur, he has ventured into a number of 
other fields, notably the methodology of economics, the role of the policymaker and economic 
justice and freedom.  
 
When neoclassical economists have tried, during the last 20 years or so, to bring the 
entrepreneur into their growth models, it has almost always been the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur. An important example is R&D driven innovations functions (e.g. Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992; Segerstrom, 1991), and also the growing field of so-called evolutionary 
modeling (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002). The function of the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur is to disturb an existing circular flow, or equilibrium. But since Kirzner 
questions the notion of an existing equilibrium, he also rejects the assumption on which 
Schumpeter builds his theory. Therefore, we must also ask what the function of the Kirznerian 
entrepreneur is with respect to economic growth. 
 
In what follows we will address most of these issues. Besides trying to cover as many of 
Kirzner’s contributions as possible, there is another rationale for presenting such a broad array 
of issues. Many of the questions Kirzner raises on methodology, policy and justice are absent 
in the neoclassical framework. But Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship changes the point of 
reference. In doing so, it does not only change the answers but also the questions raised. From 
Kirzner’s perspective, the issue of freedom, justice and a fair society are crucial for 
understanding economic reality. 
 
In the next section, we position Kirzner within the Austrian tradition and outline some 




section 4 discusses the implications for economic policy. We then turn to the issues of justice 
and freedom in section 5. In section 6, we relate Kirzner’s thinking to other theories of 
growth. We conclude by returning to what we consider to be Kirzner’s greatest contribution, 
namely to bridge the gap between Austrian and neoclassical thinking.  
 
2. The Austrian Legacy 
It is into [a] bewildering mass of empirical data that the economic point of view throws 
a ray of light. It enables us to grasp an element that does introduce a measure of 
explanation into social phenomena. (Kirzner 1960, §7.60) 
 
 
Israel M. Kirzner is the most prominent contemporary member of the school of Austrian 
economists. Broadly defined, this school once included Carl Menger, Eugene von Böhm-
Bawerk, Joseph Schumpeter, Ludwig von Mises, Frank Knight and Friedrich von Hayek as 
towering figures. However, the marginal revolution and neoclassical economics soon gained 
ground over the loosely structured early Austrian school. Since then, the Austrian school has 
for a long time been classified as a heterodox approach. However, in recent years, Kirzner has 
become the leader of what has been called ”the Austrian revival” (Gloria-Palermo, 1999). The 
Kirznerian entrepreneur has proved to embody a fruitful combination of different strands of 
thinking within the Austrian tradition. To understand Kirzner’s writings, it is important to 
posit him against the legacy of Menger and against his more recent predecessors, Ludwig von 
Mises and Friedrich von Hayek. 
 
As is often the case, what to an outsider might look like a fairly homogenous tradition is on 
closer inspection much more diverse. In particular, the main schism within the Austrian 
school can probably be derived from conflicting views about how to deal with the legacy of 
Menger’s concepts of subjectivity and ignorance (Kirzner, 1995). Some Austrians, notably 
Ludwig Lachmann (1976), have argued that if these concepts are taken seriously, the idea of a 
possible equilibrium must be abandoned (Vaughn, 1992). If people are ignorant of so much in 
the environment in which they act and if there is no such thing as ”objective data” on which to 
act, then how can we propose that their actions are moving the economy toward a state of 
equilibrium? In fact, how can we even conceptualise the notion of equilibrium? 
 




due to Mises and part is due to Hayek (Binenbaum, 1995). The part emanating from Mises 
(1949) is the notion of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneurial element in action is the element 
that makes individuals capable of coping with (genuine) uncertainty and limited knowledge. 
This is not to say that the entrepreneur in one stroke overcomes the limitations implied by 
subjectivity. And it is not to say that entrepreneurs cannot be mistaken and ventures fail. But, 
in small steps, the actions of entrepreneurs tend to make the market more coordinated. Here, 
Kirzner draws on Hayek’s (1937) notion of coordination and gradual learning. Vernon 
Smith’s (1962) work is also worth mentioning as the starting point for another strand of 
research along these lines. 
 
Menger’s recognition of ignorance and economic mistakes in his economic theory and his 
emphasis of understanding rather than formal analysis meant a rejection of the notion of full 
information equilibrium. As we have seen, Kirzner does not agree with the most radical 
interpretation of this rejection. But why has he embraced it in a weaker form? In his early 
work, Kirzner (1960) criticizes Lionel Robbins’s (1932) view of economics – that economics 
is the “science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce 
means which have alternative ends”. According to Kirzner, this view reduces economics to a 
formal and mechanical means-end calculus. By positing given ends, this view overlooks what 
is to Kirzner the crucial element of economics, namely that agents act purposefully. The 
foundation of economic science is that individuals act so as to improve their position and do 
so purposefully. This is the economic point of view.  
 
The definition made by Robbins narrows this view significantly, and rules out many kinds of 
economically relevant analyses. This is a point forcefully stated in the introductory chapter to 
Kirzner’s most influential work, the 1973 monograph Competition and Entrepreneurship. In 
equilibrium, means and ends are already given, and there is no scope for analyzing how they 
are determined. Since this is exactly the entrepreneurial function, there is no place for the 
entrepreneur. Moreover, Kirzner stresses that competition loses its meaning in an equilibrium 
framework. In equilibrium, competition has ceased, it is reduced to a technical tool 
convenient when solving mathematical models. But nothing is said about competition as a 
process. 
 
It is a highly complex issue to disentangle in what sense Kirzner rejects equilibrium analysis. 




as a theoretical framework than because of its failure to correspond to empirical reality. It can 
be argued that no single (known or future) universal theory of economics is capable of 
addressing more than a restricted range of economic problems (Eliasson, 1996). Social theory 
is always problem dependent and therefore, economic analysis entails the choice of the 
appropriate model for the particular problem chosen. In this sense, the Austrian school and 
Kirzner offer a framework for analyzing many problems that cannot be dealt with when using 
a neoclassical toolbox. 
 
3. The Kirznerian Entrepreneur 
The entrepreneur’s activity is essentially competitive. And thus competition is inherent 
in the nature of the entrepreneurial market process. Or, to put it the other way around, 
entrepreneurship is inherent in the competitive market process. (Kirzner 1973, p. 17) 
 
 
We have seen that the notion of equilibrium is important for Kirzner. However, the main 
emphasis is put on the dynamic and rivalrous process that pushes the economy towards 
equilibrium rather than the state of equilibrium. It is this process that provides a habitat for the 
entrepreneur; the entrepreneur is not someone who operates in a world of given prices and 
information. Instead, the entrepreneur is the agent that purposively changes prices, quantities 
and other “data” (Kirzner, 1997). ”Alertness” is the key attribute of the Kirznerian 
entrepreneur; an alertness to hitherto unnoticed opportunities. In the simplest case, this 
entrepreneur coincides with the arbitrageur, who recognizes a profit-opportunity in the price 
differentials in different markets. Viewed in this way, it is easy to fit the Kirznerian 
entrepreneur into an equilibrium framework. As pointed out by Vaughn (1992), this is simply 
a more carefully stated version of the story that a countless number of economics professors 
tell their students when showing how markets attain equilibrium. But that is the story of 
maximization given means and ends; Kirzner’s emphasis on ”alertness” precedes that story. 
The implications of this will become clear when we discuss the role of the policymaker and 
entrepreneurship and growth. 
 
The alertness to disequilibria must be coupled with another important characteristic, namely 
that an entrepreneurial act is always carried out under (genuine) uncertainty. Uncertainty is 
distinct from calculable risk. Nor is it appropriate to characterize the entrepreneur as someone 




kind of uncertainty referred to is best understood as resulting from a subjectivist approach. 
Now, the entrepreneurial element of action is what makes the individual able to tackle this 
uncertainty: 
 
Entrepreneurship in individual action consists in the endeavor to secure greater 
correspondence between the individual’s future as he envisages it and his future as it 
will in fact unfold […] Scope for entrepreneurship is provided by the uncertainty of the 
future […] In the absence of entrepreneurial alertness it is only sheer chance that can be 
responsible for successful action. (Kirzner 1985, p. 58) 
 
This quotation seems to imply that the capacity of alertness completely shields the 
entrepreneur from making mistakes. Here, it is important to recognize the level of abstraction 
at which Kirzner carries out his analysis. First, the notion of an entrepreneur is slightly 
misleading since Kirzner refers to an element in human action (or a specific function) rather 
than particular individuals or entities. For instance, as we will see later, although this element 
is distinct from the financial function, both can be embodied in the same individual. Second, 
the entrepreneurial element is present in all human action (Kirzner, 1973). One way of 
understanding this is that in a setting where the individual acted under genuine uncertainty 
and ignorance of many of the surrounding circumstances, the maximizing agent would fail to 
make any decision at all. The plethora of possible states and her awareness of uncertainty 
would put her in a state of apathy. The view that all action to a smaller or greater degree 
contains an entrepreneurial element makes it easier to understand the possibility of mistakes. 
To the extent that an action is entrepreneurial, the agent lifts himself above the veil of 
ignorance. Alertness is the guide towards a desirable outcome. 
 
This entrepreneur who brings the economy towards equilibrium is usually contrasted to the 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur who disrupts existing equilibria (Kirzner, 1999). This difference 
is better understood if innovations are introduced. A key characteristic of Schumpeter’s 
entrepreneur is the boldness and resolve that enables him or her to introduce innovations 
despite social resistance and skepticism (Schumpeter, 1934). These characteristics do not 
appear in the Kirznerian entrepreneur. In fact, Kirzner (1999, p. 13) writes: 
 
If [the entrepreneur] has not seen that opportunity in so shining a light that it drives him 
to its implementation in spite of the jeering scepticism of others, and in spite of the 
possibility of its ultimate failure—then he has not really “seen” that opportunity.  
 




needed. According to Kirzner, what is essential to the entrepreneurial act is not boldness, self-
confidence and courage but a kind of vision. In practice, Kirzner admits that such a clear 
entrepreneurial insight that would dispel every trace of doubt is virtually impossible. Once 
more, we must bear in mind the level of abstraction of Kirzner’s analysis and that the 
entrepreneurial element is only present to some degree in real actions. It is also important to 
see that Kirzner’s main interest is to pinpoint the essence of the economic function of the 
entrepreneurial act, not to put it in a social context. 
 
A good illustration of the difference vis-à-vis Schumpeter is found in Kirzner (1999). Here, he 
discusses the introduction of automobiles and the effects of this on the horse-carriage 
industry. His analysis diverges sharply from that of Schumpeter. According to Kirzner, it is 
not correct to say that the introduction of automobiles disrupted an existing equilibrium. On 
the contrary, the market was at a severe disequilibrium at the time when automobiles were 
introduced because too many resources were allocated to the obsolete horse-carriage industry. 
 
Attempts have been made to fuse Kirznerian and Schumpeterian entrepreneurs. For instance, 
Holcombe (1998) and Fu-Lai Yu (2001) explain growth as a combination of adaptive and 
disruptive movements by Kirznerian and Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, respectively. The 
discrepancy in analytical level and approach has led others to doubt that such a fusion is 
possible (e.g. Glancey and McQuaid, 2000, p. 75). 
 
4. The Role of the Policymaker 
To the extent that [government policies] suspend or inhibit the market process, they are 
obstructing a process of discovery without offering any substitute for it. Let us not 
forget that the market process has the function of alerting market participants to 
opportunities which nobody has expected. To initiate governmental policies to grapple 
with externalities is, in effect, to pretend knowledge which no one can, in principle, 
honestly claim to possess. (Kirzner 2000, p. 82) 
 
 
In his brief 1982 article on entrepreneurship in economic growth, Kirzner asks: “How do we 
discover what needs to be done, when this has not yet been perceived?” Can the government 
act as an entrepreneur? Should it even try? Is this an invitation to the government to act? To 




already at that time was hugely overestimated. The purposeful individuals ruled, or rather 
should rule, and centralization was anathema. Many of the institutions that facilitated market 
processes were not really the creation of government, they argued, but had been 
spontaneously created in the market and then been monopolized by the government, most 
often to the detriment of their functionality. Menger’s (1892) analysis of the spontaneous 
origin of money is still a well-known reference. How about Israel Kirzner, who has lived 
through the Keynesian revolution and experienced the centralized thinking embodied in the 
neoclassical model? 
 
Kirzner (1985, chapter 2) provides a concise summary of his view on government 
interventions in the free market. The most important point was made already in Kirzner 
(1973, p. 231ff), where he discussed Demsetz’s (1969) “Nirvana fallacy”. As argued by 
Kirzner, standard welfare economics views policy as a choice between an ideal, known norm 
and an existing “imperfect” (institutional) arrangement. The ideal norm is assumed to be 
known to the policymaker. Hence, as Pelikan (1988) observes, there will be no way for the 
market to beat a centralized policymaker. The central planner will always win the theoretical 
contest. But the ideal norm, or optimum allocation, is not always known. Indeed, in Kirzner’s 
writings, it is imperative that Nirvana is unknown, and not even knowable. The role of the 
entrepreneurs is to push the economy in the direction of a possible Nirvana. 
 
To put the question bluntly, can Soviet-style central planners be good entrepreneurs? One 
problem with central planning that is commonly mentioned is that a social planner lacks the 
computational power to gather and process all necessary information. No single actor, 
asserted Hayek (1945), is capable of this. But the market works differently, through a process 
of coordinating the bits and pieces of knowledge scattered throughout the economy and to 
“communicate information”. In this respect, Hayek’s market process far outperforms the 
planner. The largest problem, though, and the one that Kirzner emphasizes, is that there does 
not exist an equilibrium to compute. There is information that is not only unknown to the 
planner, but that is still unknown to the individual agents – these are the entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Therefore, the question is who is most able to discover these opportunities: a 
central planner or millions of agents with entrepreneurial abilities. 
 
There may certainly be innovations in the Soviet Union, Kirzner argues. But he (1982, p. 275) 




because without the market guidance of profit and prices, we cannot know if innovations are 
“socially worth while”. In a planned economy agents act, not on market incentives but on the 
directives and incentives from higher levels of the hierarchy. In effect, superior bureaucrats 
make the entrepreneurial decisions about which opportunities are important to heed. But what 
guides their judgment about what to reward? The answer must be the orders from still higher 
levels in the bureaucracy. Besides drastically reducing the number of entrepreneurial 
decisions, the error-correcting market process is completely circumvented in the socialist 
hierarchy. There is nothing per se that contradicts that centralized planners can introduce 
innovations. The chief problem is instead to ensure that the innovations are socially 
beneficial, and if not to find ways of correcting judgment. Another problem that Kirzner 
(1985) mentions is that since profit incentives are largely absent in the government sector, the 
process of discovery of new opportunities will be hampered and this sector will lag behind in 
productivity. 
 
A similar analysis is Kirzner (2000), where the analysis is framed by the concepts of “inner” 
and “outer” limits to the market. The inner limits are drawn up by market failures, i.e. respects 
in which the market fails to perform optimally. These would constitute a bound on what the 
market could achieve if left to itself. Outer limits are defined by institutions, notably private 
property rights and freedom and enforceability of contracts. Kirzner questions the notion of 
inner limits and, in particular, that this can be used as a justification for government 
involvement. The reason is that it rests on studying an economy against the benchmark of a 
social optimum or equilibrium. But, as we have seen, Kirzner rejects the idea of a social 
planner who could outperform the market. However, government involvement can be justified 
on the grounds of outer limits, although Kirzner is careful to emphasize that many of these 
institutions have an ethical foundation and they often change through an evolutionary process 
rather than abrupt interventions.  
 
After Baumol’s (1990, 2002) contributions, it is natural to ask if inappropriate institutions can 
channel the entrepreneurial potential to non-productive uses. To the best of our knowledge, 
Kirzner does not address this issue, but according to his definition of entrepreneurship, all 
forms of rent seeking that do not involve an element of discovery are excluded. Furthermore, 
the close relation between the entrepreneur, freedom of entry and the competitive process 
indicates that the possibility of unproductive or destructive entrepreneurship is not a major 




under appropriate circumstances, notably freedom of entry, can be tapped at zero cost. This 
follows from Kirzner’s view that entrepreneurship is not a resource; hence, there is no 
opportunity cost associated with the “use” of entrepreneurship. It is essentially dynamic and 
hence cannot be added to capital and labor in growth equations (e.g. Kirzner, 1973, 1985). 
 
 
5. On Freedom and Justice 
Entrepreneurship does not consist of grasping a free ten-dollar bill which one has 
already discovered to be resting in one’s hand; it consists in realizing that it is one’s 
hand that it is available for the grasping…The discovery of a profit opportunity means 
the discovery of something obtainable for nothing at all. No investment at all is 
required; the free ten-dollar bill is discovered to be already within one’s grasp (Kirzner, 
1973, p. 47, 48, italics in original) 
 
 
In the previous section, we saw that Kirzner sides with the Austrian tradition in his skepticism 
towards government involvement in markets. But his defense of freedom goes even deeper. 
He maintains that the neoclassical framework is incapable of accounting for the role of 
freedom in a proper way (Kirzner, 1979). In that framework, removal of an option might 
mean two things. Either it is a lower ranked option in which case the individual is not affected 
at all, or it is a preferred option in which case the individual’s welfare is impaired. In both 
cases, the individual is free to choose among the remaining options. However, according to 
Kirzner, the real infringement of freedom occurs earlier, before ends and means are 
determined. The removal of an option restricts the range within which this decision can be 
made and therefore, there is more to free choice than feasibility today. There is claimed to be 
a “fertility of freedom”; an option that cannot be utilized today may nevertheless induce 
people to strive for a position where it can be attained it in the future. This has important 
social implications over and beyond the utility flowing from the provision of goods of a 
higher preference order. 
 
The second topic of this section, justice of the free market, is a theme that runs through much 
of Kirzner’s writings. To understand Kirzner’s position, we must once more begin with his 
notion of an entrepreneur who discovers new opportunities, which have hitherto been 
unnoticed. These opportunities were “utterly unknown” and not “known to be knowable” 




costs (Stiglitz, 1994). By his discovery, the entrepreneur has not only reallocated a given 
amount of resources but has, in effect, expanded it. This provides the ethical justification for 
private property; new possibilities are exploited in order to raise the social product. Naturally, 
factors of production should be paid compensation, but the entrepreneur has a legitimate 
claim to the residual since without him, no production would have occurred (Kirzner, 1979). 
According to Kirzner, the reward to the entrepreneur cannot be put on an equal footing with 
compensation to factors of production; in fact, as we have seen, entrepreneurship is not even a 
resource. He goes as far as saying that the entrepreneur’s initiative implies that “[he] has 
produced the whole product entirely on his own” (ibid., p. 194, italics in original). 
 
Burczak’s (2002) critique sheds some more light on this “finders-keepers” defense of profits. 
His first line of critique draws on Stiglitz and Weiss’ (1981) argument that financial markets 
work imperfectly. Hence, not everyone has the option of becoming an entrepreneur. 
Moreover, the visibility of many opportunities are conditional on the possession of resources. 
The main thrust of Kirzner’s (2002) response to this critique is that it may be very difficult to 
disentangle the entrepreneurial and the financial function. In practice, it is not (financially) 
feasible for everyone to become an entrepreneur, in the sense of becoming a business owner. 
But, argues Kirzner, the distinction between entrepreneur and financier is still theoretically 
sound, and it is the creative aspect of the entrepreneurial element that gives rise to excess 
(supranormal) profits. 
 
Burzak’s other line of criticism is that the workers who partake in production can never be 
void of responsibility and creativity. Hence, the entrepreneur is not the only one who should 
be rewarded for these functions. A longer example presented in Kirzner (1973, p. 57ff) 
provides an answer that parallels the one in Kirzner (2002). Suppose A owns a gun and hires a 
hunter B to put it to use. Now, A must certainly pay B the market wage for hunter services. 
But what if B possesses an exceptional alertness to good hunting grounds and that, 
consequently, he delivers much more output to A than the market wage implies? Kirzner 
presents two possibilities. Either B is not sufficiently alert to his own virtues as a hunter, in 
this case it is A who is the entrepreneur who has been able to notice B’s capacity and put it to 
use. Or, B is himself able to realize his ability and captures the additional opportunities 





6. The Role of the Entrepreneur in Economic Growth 
The entrepreneurial spirit, the potential for discovery, is always waiting to be released. 
Human ingenuity is irrepressible and perennial, and its release requires an environment 
free from special privileges or blockages of new entrants. For the successful allocative 
functioning of the market, and for the stimulation of dynamic growth, the entrepreneur 
must not be taken for granted. (Kirzner, 1985, p. 92)  
 
 
In his comprehensive treatise Entrepreneurship, Perception, Opportunity and Profit (1979), 
Kirzner devotes one chapter to entrepreneurship and development. He begins by observing the 
lack of understanding of the role of the entrepreneur in economic development as a “yawning 
gap” (p. 107). Siding with Baumol (1968), he observes that the entrepreneur has virtually 
disappeared from economic theory and that (now quoting Leibenstein, 1968) “received theory 
of competition gives the impression that there is no need for entrepreneurship”. And, as we 
have seen, there is indeed no role to play for the Kirznerian entrepreneur in the neoclassical 
framework. But how can we understand the Kirznerian entrepreneur from a growth 
perspective? 
 
It is here appropriate to refine Kirzner’s view of the notion of equilibrium. To simply say that 
equilibrium has meaning for Kirzner as a goal, as something the economy tends towards, is 
somewhat too simplistic. The example in section 3 with automobiles and the horse-carriage 
industry reveals that Kirzner’s analysis is more dynamic, since new opportunities are 
introduced. Kirzner (1992) uses the concepts of Underlying Variables (UV) and Induced 
Variables (IV) to explain his concept of a market process. UVs are preferences, resources and 
technological possibilities. IVs are prices, methods of production and output quantities. In 
mainstream economics, Kirzner argues, IVs are completely determined by UVs. And 
according to radical subjectivists (see Lachmann, 1976), IVs and UVs cannot at all be 
separated. Kirzner stands somewhere in between these opposing views. He writes (1999, p. 
43): 
 
If we wish to analyse the market process it is therefore most useful to conduct mental 
experiments against the imagined background of unchanging UVs. In full reality, of 
course, the market process never does proceed in pure form. Rather, what we encounter 






At first, this might be interpreted as evidence that long-run growth, in which the UVs change, 
is not what Kirzner is interested in. Here, we must be careful not to commit the fallacy of 
equating a theory of growth with the neoclassical theory of growth. Kirzner does not advocate 
a growth theory where entrepreneurs appear as a stock-variable alongside other resources 
such as capital and labor, but this does not mean that his theory is irrelevant for the study of 
long-term growth. 
 
It is instructive to seek a rationale for Kirzner’s approach in the writings of two of the 
founding fathers of economics, Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Ricardo’s (1821) theory 
describes output as a function of land, labor and capital, whereas Smith (1776) saw growing 
markets, division of labor and innovations as the engines of growth. It was the former 
approach that proved tractable to mathematical modeling and it provided the basis for 
neoclassical theory. In contrast, Kirzner’s approach can be seen as an extension of that of 
Smith in that it accounts for the process by which innovations are introduced (Holcombe, 
1998). In a very important sense this is growth, because the entrepreneurial discovery of 
opportunities means that previous errors, sources of suboptimal functionality of the market, 
are being corrected. This is why Kirzner (1963), in an early article “On the Premises of 
Growth Economics”, says that the growth problem must “be placed in proper perspective as 
an allocation problem”. 
 
In this sense, Kirzner’s contributions tell a story that can be related to neoclassical growth 
theory. Resource allocation and growth are two aspects of the same phenomenon (Kirzner, 
1963). “Economics explains that where there are unexploited profit opportunities, resources 
have been misallocated […] Entrepreneurship corrects [such] waste” (Kirzner, 1982). It is 
obvious that the dynamics of resource allocation provides a link between entrepreneurship 
and growth, even if it is not explicitly spelt out. 
 
Another way of uncovering the link between entrepreneurship and growth is to note that 
Kirzner is attempting to return to Adam Smith’s conception of competition (Jakee and Spong, 
2003). We have already seen that Kirzner sides with Hayek’s (1948) criticism that perfect 
competition in equilibrium theory is synonymous with the absence of competition. In contrast, 
Kirzner argues that entering new firms are the agents that drive the competitive process, by 
introducing new goods and thereby also disciplining incumbent firms. The same decidedly 




subsequent models of entrepreneurial entry as the mover of the competitive process. A direct 
policy implication from this analysis is that stimulating competition and entry is preferred to 
the conventional policy prescriptions of antitrust interventions toward potential monopolists 
(Kirzner, 1973). Similar results follow from modern game-theoretic analyses of oligopoly 
firms (Horn and Persson, 2001). Audretsch et al. (2001) provide an excellent survey of this 
literature, and discuss its links to the Austrian tradition. 
 
But we are still left in Kirzner’s “thought experiment” of unchanging underlying variables. 
Does this not imply that we will reach a “steady state”, beyond which growth cannot be 
explained? Apparently, Kirzner acknowledges a “continual change” in the UVs, but can he 
explain this change? Holcombe (1998) is an attempt to extend Kirzner’s theory to long-run 
growth. Growth becomes a self-reinforcing process where entrepreneurial discoveries create 
new opportunities. An entrepreneurial discovery injects dynamism to the economy by 
changing the environment for other entrepreneurs. In a further elaboration, Holcombe (2003) 
points to the important role of the institutional setting in inspiring individuals to purposefully 
seek out opportunities (see also Douhan and Henrekson, 2007).  
 
7. Can Austrian and Neoclassical Economics Be Bridged? 
The neglect of entrepreneurship in modern analysis is a direct consequence of the 
general preoccupation with final equilibrium outcomes. (Kirzner, 1979, p. 5) 
 
Q: Do you regard your entrepreneurial insight as a bridge between the Austrian and 
neoclassical worlds?  
KIRZNER: The word ”bridge” is a diplomatic word. I’ve been accused of turning 
Austrian economics into a footnote of neoclassical economics. I think that is incorrect. 




Kirzner’s disapproval of neoclassical theory can be understood as a critique of its inability to 
account for the entrepreneur. We have seen that there is, according to Kirzner, much more to 
this shortcoming than a simple neglect. In fact, the failure of neoclassical theory to account 
for what Kirzner calls the entrepreneurial element of human action is deeply rooted in its 
methodological approach and framework (Barreto, 1989; Bianchi and Henrekson, 2005). At 
the same time, we have also seen that Kirzner is much more favorable and close to 




seems like a fundamental difference, Kirzner has persistently approached and related his 
theories to mainstream economics. What kind of a bridge is this? 
 
We have repeatedly stressed that the Austrian framework makes us able to see problems that 
have escaped the neoclassical analysis. Kirzner’s contribution in this respect is no small 
achievement. We would argue that there is more. The discussion about different frameworks 
often neglects the fact that many problems only become visible from a particular approach. As 
a consequence, adherents to different approaches often have difficulties in understanding each 
other, even within the same discipline. In the light of this, Kirzner’s most important 
contribution may be that he has made the Austrian school intelligible to other economics 
scholars. By aligning Austrian thinking to neoclassicism, the issues and problems have 
become visible to a much broader audience.  
 
In this respect, Kirzner has not only contributed to a school within the discipline of economics 
but he has influenced the field of economics more broadly. The neglect of entrepreneurship in 
mainstream economics urged Kirzner to persist in arguing that as long as the standard 
economic theory has no room for individuals pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities, 
something of utmost importance has been omitted. 
 
One might be tempted to say more about Kirzner’s success in this respect. For instance, has 
his entrepreneur been successfully integrated into neoclassical theory? The answer is no, and 
probably it can never be integrated. And, most likely, this was never Kirzner’s intention. But 
Kirzner has succeeded in developing a highly convincing account of the role of the 
entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial function in a market economy. In doing so, and doing it 
in a language to which mainstream economists can relate, he has also made evident important 
shortcomings of neoclassical theory. This will certainly continue to inspire mainstream 
economists to seek new and refine old methods and theories. There is no doubt that this makes 
Israel M. Kirzner a worthy recipient of The International Award for Entrepreneurship and 
Small Business Research. 
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